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A race to the bottom
Among the reasons that high-tech
companies obtain patents, perhaps the most
common is to build a defensive arsenal. To
guard against the risk of patent litigation,
companies acquire patents so they can
retaliate against or neutralise threats of
suits brought by others. A large patent
portfolio is thought likely to discourage
such threats in the first place. 
In theory, that is how things are
supposed to work. Reality has proved to be
more complicated. Most obviously,
mountains of patents have shown themselves
to be useless against the US patent system’s
stateless actors – patent assertion entities
(PAEs) which are invulnerable to patent
infringement counterclaims because they
make nothing. PAE lawsuits (including
declaratory judgments involving their
patents) have risen in recent years,
representing approximately 19% of suits in
the 2000 to 2008 period (Figure 1) and an
approximate doubling over that time, from
about 13% to 25%.
In addition, as the current smartphone
wars make plain, the patent arms race has
failed to bring about patent peace between
competing companies – at least in the short
term. Although unprecedented in number,
such suits between practising companies are
not rare in kind. According to a study I
published in 2009, suits between practising
companies making over US$100 million in
The defensive patent arms race,
and companies’ consequent focus
on quantity rather than quality as
they build their portfolios, causes
them and others a great many
problems
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revenue per year represent 28% of all high-
tech patent litigations and are the most
common type (Figure 1). They also last
longer than other suits – on average, around
14 months, while patent assertion entity
suits resolved in 9.1 months. Though
perhaps fewer suits than otherwise would
have been brought, the number of large
company suits suggests that defensive
patenting has not accomplished anything
close to resembling patent peace among
practising companies.
Despite these limitations, the patent
arms race is alive and well, as this year’s
purchases of the Motorola Mobility and
related patent portfolios remind us. Having a
large patent portfolio makes companies that
have been threatened feel safer. Unlike
weapons, patents are not inherently
dangerous and can be quite useful. They
disclose information about inventions,
including how to make and use them, for
others to learn from and improve upon.
Patents provide a proxy of innovative activity,
signalling to investors a company’s pipeline
or promise. They also facilitate specialisation
– innovative small companies can
concentrate on inventing, before passing
along their technologies to others to develop,
manufacture and distribute in product form. 
The practice of mass cross-licensing (or
perhaps more commonly, mass ignoring) of
patent portfolios is cheaper and more
efficient than trying to determine –  in
negotiations, by a judge or before a jury
– which products might infringe what
patents, in what countries and to what
degree. To the extent that patents enable
the exchange of information or the trading
of product features, they benefit consumers.
An armed society is a polite society.
Deeply lawed
This conventional wisdom motivates
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patenting in high-tech industries. But in
light of the resources devoted to defensive
patenting, and defensive patent acquisition,
it is worth considering its history, practice
and impact on the patent system. When this
is done it is hard not to conclude that the
arms race logic of “more patents, less
lawsuits” is deeply flawed. 
Though defensive patenting probably
does ward off some lawsuits, it works less
well when there are asymmetric stakes,
whether among practising companies or
between practising and non-practising
companies. This incomplete protection has
come at a significant, and thus far
overlooked, social cost. Mass patenting
means that patent quality suffers, and that
the line in which companies must wait to
have their patents examined grows longer –
making for a greater backlog. Patents
acquired to shield their owners have
ironically ended up being used as swords in
the hands of others. 
How can this be? The patent arms race
drives companies to obtain large number of
patents that are intended to be held
defensively. In pursuit of patent quantity,
companies invest limited resources and
time in each individual patent. This
translates into lower patent quality
– attributable not only to the patent office,
but also to the patent arms race and the
low-cost, high-volume patents that are
obtained in pursuit thereof. It also results in
a large number of patent applications.
Crowning the list of top US patentees, year
after year, are high-tech companies (Table
1). The US Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) has been unable to keep up with
the volume of applications, exacerbating the
patent backlog. Finally, defensive patenting
has led to the creation of stockpiles of
unused patents. Though acquired in the
name of peace, a number of patents initially
acquired defensively have ended up in the
hands of PAEs – arguably increasing, rather
than reducing, patent risk. (Table 2)
How a dilemma was created
To the casual observer, it would appear that
technology companies file for large numbers
of patents as a matter of course. But it was
not always thus. In the late 1980s and early
1990s, many innovative high-tech
companies did not file for patents. By the
turn of the millennium, many had reversed
stance and were filing for hundreds and
even thousands of patents per year as part
of the patent arms race. 
The origins of the patent arms race can
be traced to the corporatisation of US R&D
and development of case law around the
turn of the 20th century. The demise of a
doctrine disfavouring unworked patents, as
well as the rise of strategic uses of patents,
contributed to a shift away from the
individual patent and towards the patent
portfolio. With it, the romantic notion of an
individual US inventor toiling in solitude
before obtaining a patent and introducing
his revolutionary lightbulb to the market
gave way to large-scale R&D and patent
acquisition. Large companies grew to view
patents – often over technologies they
ultimately did not commercialise – as an
important strategic weapon in the battle
against their equally large, patent-fortified
rivals. 
PAE (19%)
Individual inventor (4%)
Small v Large (18%)
Sports of kings suits
(28%)
Limited stakes 
(16%)
Predation/bullying
(8%)
Defendant
size
Plaintiff size
Figure 1. Distribution of high-tech patent lawsuits (2000-2008)
Source: Colleen Chien, "Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech
Patents” 87 North Carolina Law Review 1571-1615  (2009)  
Line divides companies with US$100 million annual revenue. An additional 7% of litigations are either initiated by universities or
otherwise do not fit into one of the categories shown.
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Henry Ford was an early defensive
patenter. According to accounts, he
accumulated car patents to reduce the risk
of being sued and gain the ability to operate
freely, without ever having to enforce the
company’s patents. Filing for patents gave
Ford the ability to trade rights with his
competitors and to prevent the technology
from being patented by others. 
The patent arms race in the software
and hardware industries has developed more
recently. In the case of software, for
example, patents have become more readily
available. In 1994 the Federal Circuit ruled
that software running on a general purpose
computer could be patented (in Re Alappat);
in 1998 it concluded in State Street that
processes that produced a useful, concrete
and tangible result could too. Three other
developments spurred the adoption of
defensive patenting: the licensing
campaigns of Texas Instruments (TI) and
IBM, the patent disputes between Kodak
and Polaroid, and cross-licensing practices.
The catalysts
While eventually practised industry-wide,
modern-day defensive patenting was
catalysed by the actions of single companies
– TI and IBM. In the mid-1980s, TI began
an intensive licensing and litigation
campaign to save the company from
bankruptcy. A decade and a half and an
estimated US$4 billion later, it had achieved
its corporate objective. Along the way, it
fundamentally changed how hardware
companies approached patenting. In the
mid-1990s, finally free of an obligation to
license its patents imposed by a 1956
consent decree, IBM began its own
campaign to monetise the considerable
patent portfolio it had built up over the
years. While doing so, it set off a chain
reaction in the industry and ushered in a
new era of software patenting and licensing. 
TI’s domestic US patent licensing
campaign was inspired by the company’s
success in suing foreign competitors for
patent infringement. At first, the company’s
stance was adversarial, characterised by a
willingness to pursue litigation. Over time,
however, the company moved towards a
licensing model, signing non-exclusive
licences with major players in the industry.
TI supported these efforts with an
expanding patent portfolio, around that
time more than doubling the number of
applications it had filed in the previous
decade. In the early 1990s, most software
companies also had few patents. IBM was an
exception; as a hardware company, it had
always applied for patents. When software
patents became available, IBM captured
many of them, taking one-quarter of the
software patents issued between 1978 and
1988. The company also pushed for
development of the case law. Its appeal of a
key USPTO decision led to a new form of
claim, the Beauregard claim, and the
development of guidelines in the mid-1990s
for the examination of computer-related
inventions. 
As part of a broader strategy within the
company to patent aggressively, IBM
achieved its goal of top position in the
patenting charts by 1993 and has remained
there since. The company put these patents
to use – expanding its patent licensing
efforts in response to the introduction of a
large number of PC clones. In subsequent
years IBM launched an aggressive and
successful licensing campaign across
technology areas that brought in over US$1
billion in revenue annually by 2003.
By the late 1990s, many high-tech
companies had been stung by patent suits
and assertions. As they grew tired of paying
royalties for access to the patent portfolios
of IBM and TI, they developed their own.
The rate of semiconductor patenting per
research and development dollar doubled
1. IBM
2. Samsung Electronics
3. Canon KK
4. Microsoft Corp
5. Intel Corp
6. Hewlett-Packard Dev Co
7. Sony Corp
8. Toshiba KK
9. Micron Tech Inc
10. Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd 
Table 1: List of top recipients of US patents,
2003-present 
Source: Gazelle Technologies ©
Sun Microsystems
IBM
AT&T
Dow Chemical
3Com
Benq
Kimberly-Clark
Siemens
Philips Electronics
Table 2: List of public companies that have
offered patents at public auction 
Source: Ocean Tomo 2006-2009 auction catalogues 
IAM_51 Paginated - 1  29/11/2011  08:50  Page 12
Intellectual Asset Management January/February 2012  13www.iam-magazine.com
Armed and dangerous
between 1985 and 1995. More dramatically,
software patents, as a share of overall
patents, increased more than sevenfold,
from 2% in the early 1980s to 15% of
patents by 2002. Economic studies have
found that this change cannot be explained
by changes in R&D and related factors, but
instead by the strategic behaviour of firms.
Demonstration effects
As interviews with companies done by
Rosemarie Ziedonis and Bronwyn Hall
famously documented, demonstration
effects also caused firms to adopt portfolio
patenting strategies. A lawsuit initiated by
Polaroid against Kodak in 1976 and finally
settled in 1990 had a particularly profound
impact. As semiconductor companies
watched Kodak pay Polaroid nearly US$1
billion in damages, give its customers and
lawyers another US$600 million and shut
down its instant camera business, including
a manufacturing plant, at a cost of US$1.5
billion and 700 employees, they took fright.
This case illustrated the substantial
business risks –  including the threat of
injunction – associated with patent
infringement.
This particular lawsuit, as well as the
patent licensing campaigns of TI, had a
profound impact on shaping firm strategies.
They inspired not only fear, but awe within
the IP community. The company, led by the
genius of Richard Donaldson, demonstrated
the considerable rewards that mining a
corporate patent portfolio could yield.
Royalty payments were rumoured to have
kept TI profitable for five straight quarters
despite fierce foreign competition. 
Patent portfolios for cross-licensing
As companies grew their patent portfolios,
many followed a variant of the “patent
everything” approach. In negotiations over
complex technologies, parties focused on
the quantity as much as the quality of
patents in a portfolio. While a few patents
representative of each portfolio are
considered during negotiation, for
portfolios larger than a certain size each
patent is rarely scrutinised individually. 
The number of patents is a key input into
the calculation. 
For large patent portfolios, the high cost
of evaluating which patents might apply to
each product, the likelihood of the patents’
validity, the appropriate royalty rate and the
appropriate base from which to calculate the
royalty have led patent licences to be
negotiated en masse. Portfolio cross-
licensing, based on patent quantity and other
proxies of coverage, has simply proved to be
more efficient than the alternative.
Companies with relatively fewer patents are
disadvantaged in this calculus, unable to
effectively evaluate the large number of
patents on the other side, but with their own
smaller portfolios subject to greater scrutiny. 
This licensing dynamic has spurred the
growth of defensive patenting. Companies
file patents to gain freedom to operate,
obtain access to the technology of others
and neutralise patent lawsuits. Large
portfolios have spawned the development of
Q1 - Q3 2010 Q4 2010 - Q1 2011
Medium
company
1%
3% 4% 4% 4%
7% 7%
12%
26%28%
49%50%
1%
3%
University Government Bankrupt
company
Large
company
Small
company
Inventor
Figure 2. Small companies and individual inventors remain the primary source of
NPE/PAE patents
Source: RPX Corporation (c) 2011. Data based on NPE transactions from Jan 2010 to March 2011
Note: NPE litigations for relevant market sectors including: consumer electronics and PCs, e-commerce and software, financial
services, media content and disribution, mobile communications and devices networking and semiconductors. NPE, NCE, INV
and university suits included 
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other large portfolios. The resulting
feedback loop, according to its detractors,
creates a cycle whereby low-quality patents
beget additional low-quality patents. To
improve their bargaining position in cross-
licensing, companies engage in what Polk
Wagner and Gideon Parchomovsky have
called “portfolio maximisation” –  the
practice of growing their patent portfolios
in number and breadth. In pursuit of the
patent arms race, companies have devoted
considerable financial and technical
resources to patenting –  in some cases even
acting in opposition to their own corporate
philosophies and, arguably, their self-
interest. Of course, no one thinks their own
patents are low-quality – it’s the patents of
others that are. However, the pursuit of
numbers means that less billable time per
patent is devoted to ensuring that the
claims are precise, supported and non-
obvious over past advances.
An uneasy truce
The hope, of course, is that patent
stockpiles will bring about patent peace. But
have they really done so? There is an easy
answer to this question: no. Piles of patents,
no matter how high, provide no deterrent to
patent assertion entities that are
invulnerable to counterclaims. 
To provide a more nuanced answer,
however, the effectiveness of the arms race
at preventing competitor fights must be
considered. While it is hard to isolate the
chilling effect attributable to the threat of
retaliatory patent suits, as opposed to other
deterrents to lawsuits such as company
reputation, relationships, resources and
culture, the possibility of a countersuit
factors into the decision calculus. Thus,
although ineffective against PAEs, defensive
patenting has dampened the filing of
competitor suits over the past two decades.
Despite what has probably been the
widespread cross-infringement of patents
by companies in high-tech industries, no
company with a large patent portfolio has
been driven out of business by patent
litigation thus far, though some have come
close or had to change their business model.
However, while reducing the risk of
competitor suits, defensive patenting
clearly has not eliminated it, as any
smartphone handset maker can confirm. It
is naïve to expect companies that are
enemies in the marketplace to refrain
completely from fighting in the courtroom.
There are a few reasons why whatever
truces defensive patenting have achieved are
uneasy ones at best. 
The fallacy of defensive patenting
Companies file for or acquire patents
defensively in order to gain freedom to
operate. However, the grant of a patent does
not confer a positive right to practise one’s
own inventions; rather, it gives patentees the
right to exclude others from making, using or
selling their inventions. Defensive patenting
theory glosses over this distinction and
equates patents with the positive right to
practise instead of a negative right to exclude.
In a cold war environment in which players
patent and practise related inventions,
however, this association approximates
reality: a company’s patent portfolio allows it
to innovate freely.
Today’s complex patent ecosystem
exposes the logical fallacy behind defensive
Open market portfolios acquired by NPEs: Q1 - Q3 2010 vs. Q4 2010 - Q1 2011
Inventor Large company Medium company Small company
1%
13%
8%
-23%
Figure 3. NPE/PAE acquisitions from large companies are growing
Source: RPX Corporation (c) 2011. Data based on NPE transactions from Jan 2010 to March 2011
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patenting. Defensive patenting works best
when the parties are equally matched, with
portfolios that cover each other’s products.
But that is rarely the case anymore. In the case
of the smartphone patent ecosystem, some
companies make hardware; others make
operating systems; some make both; others
make neither – they develop applications;
still others don’t develop or make anything at
all – they just make or buy patents. Each
company has a unique business model,
exposure to patent suits and tolerance for
patent litigation. PAE lawsuits are not the only
kind to take advantage of the asymmetries
between actors in the patent arms race. In an
analysis I did, nearly one-third of large
company lawsuits involved companies
without any overlapping lines of business. In
these assertions, public companies are suing
on the patents they do not practise, borrowing
back a strategy that PAEs – arguably
originally got from practising companies.
Collaborations between practising companies
and PAEs such as Round Rock’s assertion of
the Micron portfolio, and the recent spate of
WiFi suits based on a Broadcom patent –
seem to be becoming more common. Many
technology companies are investors in
Intellectual Ventures.
The literature on patent pools
– voluntary organisations whose purpose is
to put a number of patents into a single
licensing package – also sheds light on why
patent peace is elusive. Though they come
in many varieties, pools that feature
vertically integrated firms essentially act as
large industry cross-licences. In such pools,
contributors to the pool both own the
patent and manufacture the technology and
therefore pay into and receive royalties from
the pool. This increases the incentive to
acquire patents, to increase member shares.
Patent pools often fail over arguments
about how to split the pool. Companies
tend to think their patents are more
valuable than the patents of others. Rather
than opting into a patent pool, a non-joiner
may choose to press for licences on its own
terms or reserve the right to litigate. Thus,
even when company portfolios are
comparable, they will rarely be equally
matched, either in reality or in the opinion
of the parties. Sometimes, for competitive
reasons, companies will want injunctions,
not royalties. Such factors will lead
companies to initiate litigation, even against
defendants with large portfolios.
The legacy of the patent arms race
The promise of the patent arms race is more
patents and fewer lawsuits. While defensive
patenting has probably led to fewer of
certain types of lawsuits, it has
unequivocally led to more patents. The
acquisition of these patents has significant
implications for the patent system.
High-volume, low-cost and quality
patenting
If a patentee plans to hold the majority of its
patents defensively, rather than to assert or
enforce them offensively, the patents need
not be high quality or litigation-proof. As the
patents are unlikely ever to be tested in court
– or even in a licensing negotiation – the
quantity of patents, rather than the quality of
any individual patent, is important.
Accordingly, defensive patenters tend to
apply a high-volume, low-cost approach to
building their portfolios. They invest a
limited amount of company time in each
patent and are unlikely to conduct pre-
patentability searches. Fixed-fee, fee cap and
volume pricing arrangements may be used to
reduce costs. According to Carina Tan and
Craig Opperman’s 2008 article in this
magazine, a typical high-volume, low-cost
patent filing programme was priced at around
US$7,500 per application and US$1,800 per
US office action response, about 25% less
than the average (IAM issue 27, pages 8-11).
When companies make it their objective
to file for a certain number of patents
– whether set by investor expectations,
competitive benchmarking or another
process –  the focus tends to be on the
question, “What can I patent?” instead of
“What is this patent’s strategic objective?”
The limited investment made in each
individual patent also contributes to lower-
quality examination, making it less likely
that patentees will take the time to provide
meaningful information to the USPTO.
When a company begins to patent, its
first priority is to protect its platform or
pioneering technologies. Along with patents
on new innovations, a company will
defensively acquire non-core, portfolio
builder patents that cover smaller, more
incremental inventions, which are further
removed from its core operations and
represent inventions with limited
commercialisation potential. The net effect
is that patents acquired primarily for
defensive reasons are likely not only to have
received less time and attention, but also to
cover less important, more marginal
inventions. By creating demand for patents
that are never intended to be enforced, the
patent arms race has contributed to the
problem of low-quality patents.
Patent backlog 
Defensive patenting has also been blamed
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for exacerbating backlog at the USPTO.
Although average pendencies have grown
across the board, applications examined in
the computer software, architecture and
communications technology centres have
had to wait longer to receive examination.
In 2010, for example, the USPTO took four
to six months longer to begin examination
of applications in these technology areas
and they spent eight months longer in
examination, on average. 
Unsurprisingly, in the technology areas
where the backlog has been longest, there
has been exceptionally strong growth in new
applications. The percentage of overall
applications in each of the aforementioned
areas doubled or tripled in recent years. The
growth of these new applications has
apparently outpaced the USPTO’s ability to
scale up its examination resources. A lack of
focus on the applicant side slows the
examination process. The backlog affects all
users of the system, as important patent
applications languish alongside the less
important ones in the line at the USPTO.
Patent stockpiles
Another consequence of the patent arms
race is that it has left practising companies
with large numbers of unused patents. As
the cultural barriers that have historically
prevented practising companies from selling
their patents have disintegrated, more
companies have made their patents available
for sale (Table 2, Figure 2). The patent
marketplace now provides a way for
companies to dispose of their patents. 
The result is that defensively acquired
patents may end up being asserted
offensively against other practising
companies. Intellectual Ventures has used
the patents of a former Baby Bell
telecommunications company to sue others.
The patent portfolio of licensing company
MOSAID will soon feature patents that
originated at Nokia. RPX Corp has reported
that while the bulk of non-practising entity
(NPE) patents are still sourced from small
companies and individual inventors, NPEs
are increasingly buying large company
patent portfolios (Figure 2), which are often
higher quality than patents from other
sources.
In sum, then, the patent arms race has
had an impact on the patent system that
extends beyond the simple formula of more
patents, fewer lawsuits. While deterring
some suits, patent arsenals have left
companies defenceless against PAEs, which
do not create anything, as well as against
practising companies, which sue in areas
where they do not operate. Defensive
patenting has also taken its toll on the
patent system – driving demand for low-
quality patents and creating a large number
of unused patents. While these
developments do not justify the wholesale
abandonment of defensive patenting, which
has had some deterrent effect, they do
reveal an overlooked contributor to the
current state of patent quality and patent
litigation: the patent arms race.
It’s society’s dilemma, too
As public scrutiny of the US patent system
has intensified, a larger range of reform
proposals have become viable. A problem
with some of them is that they tend to
focus on the patent landscape in tech, where
words such as broken are used to describe
what is found, and fail to take into account
industries such as drugs and chemicals,
where the system – while not completely
problem free – apparently works better.
Another problem is that they focus on the
1% to 2% of patents that are litigated, rather
than the 99% that are not.
Some of these proposals, and their
potential impact on the patent arms and the
patent system in general, are described
below. They can be grouped into three broad
categories: abolish software patents, make
patenting more expensive or difficult, and
make patents less nuclear. Despite the
passage of the America Invents Act (AIA),
the technology community continues to
press for change of the patent system to
reduce the risks associated with selling
innovative products.
Banning software patents  
Software engineers and others have called
for software and business method patents to
be abolished. The thinking is that by
eliminating the most troublesome patents,
the genie could be put back into the bottle.
Although radical sounding, the outlawing of
certain patents is precedented. According to
Gerard Magliocca, in the 19th century
Congress eliminated opportunistic patent
lawsuits brought by non-practising patent
sharks against farmers by wiping out the
patents on which the suits were based. The
America Invents Act (AIA) has attempted to
eliminate tax method patents. However,
such a proposal is not without its problems.
The definitional problem is a real one, what
is a software patent? Even if it could be
addressed, hardware and other high-tech
component industries would remain
unaffected and any issues existing there
unaddressed. Small companies also rely on
their patents to a greater degree than do
large companies. Would Google have been
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able to transfer its technology from
Stanford and raise venture capital without
the PageRank patent? Perhaps, but the path
not taken would likely have looked
different. 
Make patents more expensive or difficult
to acquire or hold onto 
If the problem is that patents are too cheap
and plentiful, one solution is to make them
more expensive and scarce. Increasing the
filing fee to US$50,000, for example, would
force companies to be more selective about
the patent applications that they file. A gold-
plated patent system of the sort promoted by
Mark Lemley and others would also do this in
part – creating a tier of patents that are
expensive to obtain while disarming others by
not granting them the presumption of
validity. Brian Love and others have also
noticed that most PAE patents are asserted
late in their term, so increasing the price and
frequency of US maintenance fees could make
a difference. With any adjustment, the devil
would really be in the detail and care would
need to be taken to ensure that price-
sensitive entrepreneurs and small entities
aren’t hurt disproportionately, and that
industry impacts are considered and taken
into account. However, the AIA gives the
USPTO expanded fee-setting authority, and
many fees changes would not require
congressional authority, making testing and
refinement more possible – at least in theory.
Make patents less nuclear
Much attention is being focused on
rationalising patent remedies. Currently, a
single infringed patent out of the 250,000
that reportedly cover smartphone
technologies could result in a large damages
award and a nearly automatic injunction at the
International Trade Commission (ITC). This
does not seem appropriate, given the totality
of interests at stake. However, determining
the right remedy is hard to do, and even
harder to predict ex ante. While district court
judges have the power to include or exclude
evidence, and set case timing, they cannot
control the parties’ lawyers, or the juries
whose presence is guaranteed by the US
Constitution. In addition, each one is only the
master of her courtroom so, at best, any
changes across the system are likely to be
implemented slowly and in a piecemeal
fashion; and will not include the ITC. Re-
examination or post-grant challenges can also
deal a surgical strike to the patents or patent
holders that are most likely to be involved in
patent battles, but they are not without their
risks. Re-examination is time-consuming and
a patent that survives the fire of re-
examination, it has been argued, may come
out Teflon-coated.
A cleaner approach would be to modify
liability for infringement. An independent
invention defence, which would excuse
certain independently derived uses of the
technology, seems like a promising option.
Such a defence, while facially technologically
neutral, would potentially be technology
specific in application, applying only to
inadvertently infringed ideas and having more
force, potentially, in tech and component
industries, where copying is rarely alleged in
litigation. Although some may argue that the
defence would add another source of
uncertainty to patent holders prior to
assertion, it is potentially easier to agree upon
whether there is independent invention than
whether a jury will find an invention obvious
in light of the prior art.  As the stakes grow,
further consideration of these ideas may be
warranted. 
Action plan
The arms race logic of more patents, less
lawsuits faces significant challenges in
today’s high-tech patent ecosystem:
• The patent arms race is most effective at
deterring litigation when the parties have
symmetric stakes to the lawsuit. 
• Patent deterrence does not apply to one
of the fastest-growing kinds of high-tech
patent litigation – litigation brought by
patent assertion entities (PAEs). It also
applies with less force to cases in which
practising companies are suing in areas in
which they don’t operate.                          
• The patent arms race can be credited with
discouraging suits between practising
companies – far fewer cases than could
have been brought have actually been
brought. However, litigation between
companies of greater than US$100 million
in revenue is the most common kind,
counting by number of cases. 
• The diversity of technology company
business models means that even
practising companies often have diverse
and asymmetric stakes, exposure and
tolerance for litigation, creating uneasy
truces between companies. 
Even if it has solved one problem, the patent
arms race has arguably contributed to others:
• Patent stockpiles - some patents
acquired initially for defensive reasons
have found their way back into the hands
of PAEs that are using them for offensive,
rather than defensive reasons. 
Corporate-origin patent assets have been
used by Intellectual Ventures to sue
others, have been acquired by Round
Rock to be asserted and in general are
increasingly being acquired by PAEs.
• Patent quality - by creating a demand for
patents that are not ever intended to be
enforced, and emphasising the quantity
over the quality of patents, the patent arms
race contributes to the limited investment
by patentees in individual high-tech patents. 
• Patent backlog - the patent backlog is
exacerbated by the large numbers of
high-tech patent filings which the USPTO
has not been able to keep pace with.
A
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This article is adapted from her law review
article: “From Arms Race to Marketplace”
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